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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2654 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL F. KISSELL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE CORRECTIONAL  
 INSTITUTE OF LAUREL HIGHLANDS; PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
CORRECTIONS OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-00058) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 23, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 11, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Michael F. Kissell, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in 
part and vacate in part the District Court’s order and will remand for further proceedings. 
 Kissell commenced this civil action by filing a pro se complaint naming the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and the Pennsylvania State 
Corrections Officers Association (“PSCOA”)1 as Defendants.  Kissell is a retired 
corrections officer who previously was employed by the DOC at both State Correctional 
Institution-Greensburg (“SCI-Greensburg”) and State Correctional Institution-Laurel 
Highlands (“SCI-Laurel Highlands”).  In 1997, Kissell, represented by counsel, filed suit 
against the DOC and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees 2 pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the 1997 action”) 
alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting incidents of sexual 
harassment at SCI-Greensburg.  The 1997 action proceeded to trial, and in 2002 a jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Kissell on the retaliation claim.3  The jury awarded Kissell 
approximately $500,000 in compensatory damages, back pay, and lost benefits.  Post-trial 
                                              
1  During his employment with the DOC, Kissell was a member of the Collective 
Bargaining Unit represented by the PSCOA. 
2  The AFSCME was the predecessor of the PSCOA.   
3  The jury, however, rejected Kissell’s sexual harassment claim.   
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motions and an appeal by the DOC4 culminated in Kissell’s reinstatement with the DOC 
at SCI-Laurel Highlands in 2004 and a $70,000 award of front pay.   
 Almost eighteen years after he initially filed suit, Kissell filed the complaint at 
issue here.  Although the complaint is difficult to decipher, it appears that his primary 
allegations relate to the structure, payment schedule, and tax consequences of the award 
from the 1997 action, as well as alleged wrongdoing of various individuals as to that 
award, including his former counsel and DOC employees.  Additionally, Kissell makes 
allegations of ongoing harassment and retaliation that continued from the time of his 
reinstatement until his retirement in 2014.  He does not elaborate regarding the specific 
nature and timing of these purported incidents.  The DOC and the PSCOA separately 
moved to dismiss Kissell’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 
 The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the motions to the extent Kissell’s 
complaint related to the structure and payment of the award in the 1997 action.  However, 
the Magistrate Judge concluded that leave to amend was warranted with respect to the 
claims of continued hostility, retaliation, and harassment given that Kissell’s civil rights 
complaint suffered from a lack of factual specificity rather than a flawed legal theory.  
The Magistrate Judge put the parties on notice that they had fourteen days to file written 
                                              
4  On appeal, the DOC challenged the adequacy of the evidence in support of the 
jury’s verdict on retaliation, certain aspects of the damages awarded, and the District 
Court’s order granting reinstatement.  We affirmed.  See Kissell v. Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cty. & Mun. Employees, 90 F. App’x 620 (3d Cir. 2004) (unpublished).   
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objections and added that, within that time, Kissell should file an amended complaint 
adequately alleging facts in support of his claims for hostility, retaliation, and harassment 
beyond those related to the award in the 1997 action.  Kissell filed a document entitled 
“Plaintiff[’s] Reply to Report and Recommendation,” which appears to be a hybrid 
amended complaint/written objections.  The District Court conducted a de novo review of 
the record, adopted the Report and Recommendation, granted the motions, and dismissed 
Kissell’s complaint for failure to state a claim, without further leave to amend.  The 
District Court explained that, “whether considered as objections or as an amendment to 
the complaint[,]” Kissell’s hybrid filing failed to allege a claim for relief against either 
Defendant.   
 Kissell filed a timely notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.  See Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007) (internal citation omitted)).    
Complaints filed pro se must be liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
94 (2007), and we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
5 
 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 
(citation and internal quotes omitted).   
  We agree with the District Court that dismissal of Kissell’s complaint was proper 
to the extent he asserted claims regarding the judgment award from the 1997 action.  
Kissell previously sought to challenge various aspects of this award; those challenges 
were rejected by the District Court in the 1997 action, and that judgment was affirmed on 
appeal.  See Kissell v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Employees, 202 F. App’x 568 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Moreover, Kissell’s ability to challenge that award is not limitless and 
cannot be accomplished by bringing an entirely new action.  Accordingly, the District 
Court’s dismissal of the complaint was proper as it related to claims arising from the 
award in the 1997 action.  Because Kissell’s claims as to that award could not be brought 
by a separate action, amendment would have been futile and dismissal with prejudice was 
proper.  We, therefore, will affirm the District Court’s order in part. 
 We do not affirm the order in its entirety because Kissell’s complaint did more 
than simply challenge the 1997 award.  Kissell titled his complaint as one for 
employment discrimination; he specifically noted that he was bringing his action based 
on Title VII, and he checked off boxes on the form indicating that he was being 
discriminated against on the basis of his race, gender, and disability.  Kissell asserted that 
he was being discriminated against at SCI-Laurel Highlands for “[f]ollowing orders of 
management” and was “ordered to cease from proceeding through the [c]hain of 
command involving reported harassment of staff by staff and other violations of [l]aw.”  
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(Kissell’s Compl. ¶ 9h).  Kissell also alleged continuing hostility, harassment and 
retaliation that took place from the time he was reinstated at SCI-Laurel Highlands until 
he retired.  He contends that staff members at SCI-Laurel Highlands, including 
management, as well as union stewards, were involved in these incidents.5   
 As iterated in his complaint, Kissell’s claims of continued hostility, harassment, 
and retaliation were vague and too speculative to survive dismissal.  See Bell Atl. Corp., 
550 U.S. 555 (holding that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level” to avoid dismissal).  That said, the claims were not per se 
invalid or based on a flawed legal theory, and Kissell has attempted to clarify those 
claims (or to seek an opportunity to do so) in his “Reply” to the Report and 
Recommendation and his appellate brief, as well as in the documents filed in support of 
his appeal before this Court.   
 “[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of 
whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing 
                                              
5  Unfortunately, the briefing by Appellees focuses primarily on issues related to 
Kissell’s purported § 1983 claim and Kissell’s attempt to revive challenges to the 
payment of his jury award.  For example, the DOC argues that the Eleventh Amendment 
bars a civil rights action against the DOC because it is an arm of the state that is not 
subject to suit under § 1983 and further asserts that any claims under § 1983 are barred 
by the two year statute of limitations.  Similarly, the PSCOA characterizes Kissell’s 
complaint as his “attempt to re-litigate pay and benefits issues previously raised and 
completely adjudicated” in the 1997 action.  The PSCOA also argues that Kissell’s action 
is barred under the two year statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions and that the 
PSCOA is not a state actor under § 1983.  These arguments fail to appreciate that 
Kissell’s complaint did more than make allegations regarding the 1997 judgment and 
sought to bring claims under Title VII as well as § 1983.    
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so would be inequitable or futile.”   Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Although the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
clearly contemplated the need to provide Kissell leave to amend, the District Court 
dismissed Kissell’s complaint without leave to amend and without determining whether 
amendment would be futile or inequitable.  The DOC notes that the District Court did not 
provide any reasons for dismissing Kissell’s complaint with prejudice and acknowledges 
that Kissell’s failure to meet Iqbal’s plausibility standard “only justifie[d] dismissal 
without prejudice and the extension of leave to file an amended complaint[,]” as opposed 
to a dismissal with prejudice on all claims.  Although the DOC asserts that we may affirm 
because amendment would be futile, we disagree.  We cannot say that amendment would 
be futile as to Kissell’s claims of ongoing hostility, harassment, and retaliation.  We will 
vacate that portion of the District Court’s order.  If Kissell can support those claims, such 
as by providing specific details regarding his allegations – the who, what, when, and 
where that will enable an assessment of his claims – the claims may survive dismissal.   
Therefore, it is not clear that amendment would be futile, and the District Court erred by 
dismissing Kissell’s complaint in its entirety without granting him leave to amend.  See 
Fletcher-Harlee, 482 F.3d at 251; see also Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (recognizing that plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend in Title 
VII action to make additional factual allegations sufficient to support a Title VII claim), 
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abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 
(2006). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   On remand, the District Court may 
wish to consider whether appointment of counsel is warranted in accordance with the 
provisions of Title VII under the circumstances here.6  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) 
(providing that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the 
court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.”) 
                                              
6  Although Kissell has not yet sought appointment of counsel, he begins his Reply 
to the Report and Recommendation by stating, “Once again the plaintiff would inform the 
Court that he is not an attorney” and asking for “some leniency in the presentation.”  He 
concludes his response to the PSCOA’s motion to dismiss by explaining that he “does not 
understand a lot of the information” presented in the motion.  Response at 5, ¶ 59. 
 
